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Abstract 
 
It is broadly acknowledged that even the most “evidence-based” clinical practice is highly value 
laden. These values are particular evident in debates about  the use of recombinant activated factor 
VII (rFVIIa)--a drug that is approved only for use in patients with rare clotting abnormalities, but is 
often used “off-label” to treat major hemorrhage. The debate about whether rFVIIa should be used 
more broadly for the management of life-threatening bleeding is polarised in spite of stakeholders 
having access to the same evidence. To understand the disagreement, we conducted a qualitative 
analysis of the published commentaries surrounding the ‘off-label’ use of rFVIIa. We found that 
conflicting epistemic and moral values influenced how evidence was interpreted, and contributed to 
the intransigence of the debate. We conclude that debates about individual therapeutic agents have 
a moral and political dimension involving competing “prudences” and that new ‘post-normal’ 
decision-making paradigms are required to resolve such disputes.   
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Introduction 
While ethics and evidence-based medicine are often viewed as separate domains of inquiry and 
practice, what we know influences what we can ethically justify doing, and what we see as our moral 
obligations shapes the way we interpret evidence. The boundaries between the moral and epistemic 
spheres become particularly blurred when the health of people is at stake, and even more-so when 
no ‘officially’ recommended medical intervention is available to help a patient in need. In these 
instances experts are often obliged to make value-laden judgements about the evidence available to 
them1. 
In the case of medicines, clinicians often need to act in the absence of clear-cut evidence of efficacy 
and safety—in part because of the way drugs are developed. While most basic scientific discoveries 
still take place in universities, it is the pharmaceutical industry that has the experience, skills, 
technology and funds to take a new chemical entity from initial discovery through to the clinic. They 
therefore ultimately have the power to decide what drugs to develop, and for what specific 
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indications. These decisions depend on a number of factors such as the likelihood that the necessary 
research can be successfully undertaken to the satisfaction of the regulator, the size of the target 
population, the price that the drug could sell for on the market, and the period of market exclusivity 
within which to recoup costs and make a profit.  
While in many instances these considerations lead to drugs that are both commercially viable and 
beneficial to society, at the same time many medical needs remain unmet because there is no 
commercial incentive to resolve them. To bridge this gap clinicians have one of two options: to enrol 
patients in experimental trials; or prescribe existing medicines in a new ways, even if these are not 
consistent with the indications approved by regulatory authorities (i.e. to prescribe medicines “off-
label”).  
Some off-label uses of medicines are supported by evidence, but in many cases clinicians need to 
extrapolate from what they know about physiology and pathology and related clinical experience. 
Off-label prescribing is, therefore, one of the clinical situations in which the boundaries between 
evidence and values become particularly blurred. The treatment of major hemorrhage using 
recombinant factor VIIa (rFVIIa) is a case in point. 
The rapid growth of rFVIIa for the treatment of uncontrolled bleeding  
 Uncontrolled bleeding is associated with high mortality, and 30% to 40% of deaths related to 
trauma are due to bleeding2. Mortality associated with intracranial hemorrhage can be as high as 
31% at 7 days3, and bleeding leads to the death of approximately one third of patients with 
cirrhosis4. Postoperative hemorrhage is also a common complication of cardiac surgery with 2% to 
8% of patients who have undergone coronary bypass grafting needing further remedial operations 
to manage bleeding5. There is clearly, therefore, a strong imperative to find better ways to control 
hemorrhage. 
Recombinant factor VIIa (rFVIIa) was originally approved under orphan drug legislation in order to 
treat the rare condition of haemophilia caused by inhibitors to particular blood clotting proteins.  
Following reports in the late 1990’s that rFVIIa was successfully used to stop bleeding in gun-shot 
trauma, there was much excitement about its potential to help patients with uncontrolled bleeding 
in other clinical settings. As a consequence, off-label prescribing of rFVIIa increased over 140-fold 
over an 8-year period in the United States, until in 2008, 97% of all uses were off-label6. A smaller 
study published in 2013 showed that all administration of rFVIIa was off-label in two Australian 
hospitals7.  
The emergence of new evidence 
In recent years, new evidence has emerged about the use of rFVIIa for severe bleeding, which 
suggests such a high-level of off-label use is unwarranted. Emerging evidence shows that rFVIIa 
offers no reduction in mortality or severe morbidity8 although in some instances it might reduce 
secondary measures such as use of blood products9, hematoma growth10, and the number of 
reoperations and transfusions11. Emergent evidence also suggests that concerns about thrombosis as 
a side effect of rFVIIa are warranted12. This new information has led to greater scrutiny of the high 
level of off-label use that had contributed to rFVIIa’s status as a “blockbuster” drug, and resulted in 
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the publication of a Cochrane review in 2012, which concluded that data supporting the off-label use 
of rFVIIa was weak, and such uses should only occur within the context of experimental trials13. 
Responses to new evidence 
In the context of this emergent evidence, one might have expected doctors to stop prescribing rFVIIa 
for major hemorrhage. A brief review of recent literature on rFVIIa, however, suggested to us that 
while some clinicians are now adamantly opposed prescribing rFVIIa for massive bleeding, many 
remain determined to continue this practice. This raises the question: why do clinicians have such 
variable responses to the same body of evidence? 
There are a number of possible (and non mutually-exclusive) explanations for this divergence in 
attitudes and practices. First, it is possible that some doctors remain committed to off-label use of 
rFVIIa because of the influence of inappropriate marketing (“off label promotion”) on doctors’ 
prescribing behaviour. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the manufacturers of rFVIIa settled a case 
in 2011for $25 million to ‘resolve civil liability arising from the illegal promotion of … NovoSeven [i.e 
rFVIIa]’14. Second, ongoing prescribing might stem from the fact that there are physiological reasons 
for believing that rFVIIa should function as an effective hemostatic agent in many different settings. 
Third, it is conceivable that the desire to use any agent to prevent or treat life-threatening 
bleeding—and the associated “rule of rescue”—accounts for at least some continued use15. Fourth, 
it may be that clinicians simply do not see the existing evidence as relevant to their particular 
patients, who might have been excluded from clinical research—a common justification for off-label 
prescribing. Finally, it is possible that the debate about use of rFVIIa is not merely a debate about 
data, but also a debate about what evidence is, about what should count as evidence, about how 
evidence should be used in clinical practice, and about how clinical contexts—particularly the desire 
to act to stop a person bleeding or dying—should influence the way the evidence is used. 
All of these possibilities, while plausible, are speculative. To clarify the reasons for divergence in 
practice, we deconstructed the debate around off label use of rFVIIa, and characterised its main 
conceptual features and tensions. We did not seek to provide a normative analysis as to whether or 
not the evidence supports the case for off label prescribing. Nor did we try to provide a historical 
analysis of how attitudes and clinical practice have changed. Rather, we sought to make visible the 
moral and epistemic values underpinning stakeholders’ opinions and practices. On the basis of our 
analysis, which is described in this article, we suggest that debates such as those surrounding rFVIIa 
will not be resolved simply by conducting more studies, and that, therefore, there is (also) a need for 
conceptual and procedural frameworks that more systematically incorporate values into clinical 
policymaking. 
Methodology 
We performed a qualitative empirical analysis of the debate surrounding the use of rFVIIa for 
management of uncontrolled bleeding. A Pubmed search was performed on 5 October 2012 using 
the search terms: recombinant FVIIa; Novoseven; recombinant factor VII; and recombinant activated 
factor VII. Since our research was concerned with the views of stakeholders rather than the evidence 
for or against the use of rFVIIa, the search results were limited to articles types ‘comments’ and 
‘editorials’ to capture relevant editorials, opinion pieces, commentaries and letters to the editor in 
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the medical literature. The search included papers published between November 1999, when the 
first published report of successful off-label use of rFVIIa was reported, and October 2012. The 
search was limited to the English language. 
In total 130 separate articles from 60 different journals were identified. The greatest number of 
articles were published in the Journal of Thrombosis and Haemostasis (18 articles), the New England 
Journal of Medicine (14 articles), Neurology (9 articles), the British Journal of Anaesthesia (6 articles), 
the Annals of Thoracic Surgery (5 articles), the Journal of Trauma (5 articles), Anaesthesia (5 articles), 
Anaesthesiology (5 articles), and the Canadian Journal of Anaesthesia (5 Articles).  
We drew both on Morse’s outline of the cognitive basis of qualitative research16 and on Charmaz’s 
outline of data analysis in grounded theory17. This procedure involved initial coding via line-by-line 
analysis and synthesizing codes into categories until no new codes could be developed from the 
data. A coding tree was generated. Throughout the data analysis, a process of constant comparison 
was employed to refine, enrich, and reorganise the emergent themes and categories. Thematic 
saturation was reached after approximately 30 articles (that is, no new themes emerged after 30 
articles had been analysed). The categories were then examined in light of a theory of ‘competing 
prudences’ that we had developed in other work on off-label prescribing18. This framework requires 
the identification of moral priorities, epistemic standards, and attitudes towards uncertainties 
expressed in the published opinions of stakeholders to determine, in broad terms, the trade-offs 
stakeholders make between these factors when faced with uncertainty. Because this was a 
qualitative analysis, rather than a systematic review, we did not attempt to enumerate the findings. 
Rather, we sought to apply, and enrich, our theory of ‘competing prudences’. 
Results 
Values and evidence in debates about rFVIIa 
According to the tenets of evidence-based medicine, one might expect the debate about off-label 
use of rfVIIa to be characterised simply by a number of questions: does the intervention harm the 
patient, does the intervention benefit the patient, and is the intervention appropriate? The last 
question can be further divided into concerns about whether the intervention is cost-effective, 
whether it is more beneficial than harmful, and whether it is more effective than alternative 
treatments available. In the absence of scientific or clinical consensus regarding the answers to these 
questions our findings reveal that participants in the rFVIIa debate argued for or against off-label 
prescribing on the basis of a number of different moral and epistemic priorities.  
Three primary moral principles were invoked throughout the debate, namely beneficence, non-
maleficence and social justice. With regards to beneficence, some stakeholders emphasised the 
therapeutic challenge faced by clinicians treating major hemorrhage, which some characterised as a 
battle that requires as many weapons and manoeuvres as possible19. The very high mortality 
associated with massive bleeding was seen to increase the moral imperative to act, and added to the 
frustration at the lack of options available20.  
On the other hand, concerns about non-maleficence (avoiding harms from rFVIIa) were apparent in 
warnings proffered by some commentators and in their calls for caution21. Perhaps most prominent 
amongst those advocating for a cautious approach was Aledort who soon after the earliest report of 
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off-label use of rFVIIa in 1999, warned against ‘extrapolating case reports to general clinical practice’ 
until the medical community understood the potential for harm from thrombosis22—a position that 
Aledort has maintained since this time23. 
Appeals to social justice were apparent in concerns about the cost of treatment, and the need to 
ensure cost-effectiveness and comparative effectiveness to increase the intervention’s value to 
society24. Perhaps the strongest statement emphasising both non-maleficence and social justice 
were apparent in the statement of Avorn and colleagues published in 2011, 12 years after rFVIIa 
started to be used off-label25: 
“So here we have a rapidly increasing use of a treatment that does not benefit patients 
and increases the risk for dangerous thrombotic events – and which the investigators 
estimate to cost $10,000 per dose. Allowing physician autonomy… is appealing, but not 
when it results in unhelpful, dangerous, and costly decisions”. 
In contrast, while other commentators acknowledged the enormous costs of rFVIIa, they denied that 
this provided sufficient justification for rationing on the grounds that beneficence, rather than 
justice, should be the principal driver of practice: 
“…we can expect continued resistance to rhFVIIa use from the blood bankers and 
pharmacists who often act as its fiscal gatekeepers but never have to give bad news to a 
patient’s family”26. 
Commentaries regarding the off-label prescribing of rFVIIa also varied enormously in their 
construction and use of knowledge. Some stakeholders emphasised their personal experiences with 
rFVIIa and the number of positive case reports published27. Others emphasised the physiological 
rationale for using rFVIIa to treat bleeding in any context28, while others were sceptical of the validity 
of clinical anecdotes, case reports and mechanistic accounts, and emphasised the necessity for 
practice to be based upon high level analyses, particularly randomised controlled trials30->29. For 
instance, Yank and Stafford stated that there was no convincing epidemiological evidence of rFVIIa’s 
efficacy, leading them to: 
“...strongly caution against such wide adoption of off-label therapeutics without 
convincing evidence of efficacy and adequate studies of harm.”30   
Our analysis revealed that positions regarding the off-label use of rFVIIa can be understood in terms 
of the weight given simultaneously to different moral principles and forms of evidence. These 
different approaches can be understood as two different forms of clinical prudence, which we have 
called “active prudence” and “precautionary prudence”.  
Active Prudence 
What we call “active prudence” is motivated by the need to confront and respond to the immediate 
needs of patients. It therefore prioritises beneficence, is focused on action rather than reflection, 
and is epistemologically pragmatic rather than idealistic. When little definitive evidence exists about 
an intervention’s benefits or harms active prudence accepts that clinicians must rely on their clinical 
judgement and personal experiences. This is especially the case when high-grade evidence is unlikely 
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to ever be generated due to practical difficulties with the research process. For instance in the 
context of management of post-partum hemorrhage, Ahonen and Jokela state: 
 “… we need randomized controlled trials to determine whether rFVIIa is effective, but 
these studies are unlikely to be implemented in the setting of unanticipated PPH… In 
2003, we started to use rFVIIa in life-threatening PPH. With growing experience we 
started to use it to avoid hysterectomy.”31 
Hauser and colleagues also illustrate an attitude consistent with active prudence when they bemoan 
the fact that the FDA would not approve rFVIIa for trauma because the CONTROL trial (a phase 3 
RCT) could only demonstrate decreased blood loss, and not mortality benefit32. They contend that 
the FDA is being contradictory for requiring ever-higher evidence standards while simultaneously 
applying more restrictive ethical standards on research. In an environment where the clinical 
problems that remain are becoming more difficult to solve, they argue this makes it all but 
impossible to generate ‘strong’ evidence.  
Active prudence is also characterised by the willingness to act in the face of uncertainty about 
harms. What is known is given priority over that which is unknown, or might never be known. For 
instance, although generally resistant to the idea of rFVIIa’s broad use for management of bleeding, 
Levi agrees that when faced with serious need, existing evidence and knowledge must be given 
priority regardless of how limited it may be: 
“…in such a catastrophic situation a potential, though uncertain, beneficial effect of 
recombinant FVIIa would weigh more strongly against unknown or theoretical safety 
issues.”33 
Roberts perhaps expresses the strongest version of active prudence by dismissing questions that do 
not address a patient’s immediate welfare as hypothetical and irrelevant34. And even if the results of 
harm are true ‘this risk is likely dwarfed by the risk of allowing blood loss to continue unabated’35. 
Hayanga argued that off-label use of rFVIIa is likely to not only continue but also increase in the 
absence of any ‘evaluative data’ due to positive results from anecdotal reports36. 
Precautionary Prudence 
The position that we refer to as “precautionary prudence”, in contrast, is characterised by a 
commitment to non-maleficence and/or social justice even if some demonstrated or hypothetical 
benefit must be sacrificed. A strong commitment to these moral principles is associated, in turn, 
with a sceptical view of claims of effectiveness that are not based on high levels of evidence 
according to the EBM hierarchy. Rather than responding to immediate clinical needs, those who 
espouse precautionary prudence prioritise the qualities of reflection and avoidance. For example, in 
his argument against the use of rFVIIa as a general haemostatic agent, Levi expresses his view that 
case studies and series are not a valid source of evidence and that what is needed is a “scientific” 
approach: 
 “...we should never be blinded by our and others’ successes in individual cases and, 
even in case of a very appealing new pharmaceutical agent, adhere to the well-founded 
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principles of creating a scientific basis for pharmacological treatment efficacy and 
safety.”37  
Levi also warns those who support rFVIIa’s use about many previous cases in the medical literature 
where new interventions had initial spectacular effects that were ‘later found to be based on 
coincidence, bias, or other confounding factors’, and therefore believes that clinical ‘logic’ is not 
reliable (p. 1696). Detry and colleagues likewise state that conclusions about rFVIIa use for the 
prevention and treatment of excessive bleeding cannot be made because there is no ‘sufficient 
scientific data ... about the efficacy and cost-effectiveness’38. 
The ideal source of evidence for those who adhere to precautionary prudence are randomised 
controlled trials. Conclusions based on ‘weaker’ sources of evidence are considered to be only 
hypotheses that need to be interpreted with caution40->39. For instance, while Hill and Subramanium 
believed that rFVIIa may cause unexpected posthemorrhagic hydrocephalus they were willing to 
concede that this is only a hypothesis and a randomised controlled trial is needed to test it: 
“We await data from the current FAST trial, a phase 3 randomised trial of factor VIIa for 
acute ICH to either affirm or refute our hypothesis”40. 
Those who promoted precautionary prudence also tended to be more concerned with the possibility 
that data on rFVIIa was biased, and that clinical trials and their reporting had been contaminated by 
funding from Novo Nordisk. They argued that, even where there was evidence to support off-label 
use of rFVIIa, this may be because ‘drug companies are … skilled in getting the results they want 
from clinical trials’41.   
Attribution of Meaning to Evidence 
The critical responses to the study published by Levi and colleagues, which reported strong evidence 
of harm associated with the off-label use of rFVIIa, provides further illustration of the two versions 
of prudence. In response to the publication of this study, some stakeholders took an active 
prudential position, and defended the off-label use of rFVIIa against emerging evidence of non-
benefit and harm. Patel and colleagues, for example, attacked the methodology of the study to 
undermine its value: 
“Pooling of groups of patients with different thrombotic and bleeding risks … does not 
assist in clinical risk–benefit decisions, since it seems evident that such patients should 
be treated differently.”42 
Arelano-Rodrigo also questioned the results by arguing that the method of analysis did not compare 
rates of death from any cause against thromboembolic events, and therefore were not clinically 
relevant43.  
In contrast, Yank and Stafford argued that the risk-benefit profile was indeed known and that there 
was no convincing evidence of efficacy, and that, therefore, any evidence of harm had to be taken 
seriously44. This view was supported in a Nature Medicine editorial in which it was argued that 
evidence of health risks associated with off-label use was ‘compelling’ and ‘worrisome’, and that in 
some cases rFVIIa was being ‘abused’45. Combined with evidence of the high rate of off-label use, it 
8 | P a g e  
 
was argued that the case of rFVIIa ‘raises questions as to how to properly regulate off-label drug 
use’. 
Avorn and Kesselheim46 also argued that the rapidly increasing use of an expensive drug ‘that does 
not benefit patients and increases the risk for dangerous thrombotic events’ is not only unwarranted 
and driven by commercial rather than clinical factors, but also created the possibility of claims 
against doctors in negligence. In support of active prudence, Karkouti and Levy responded that 
‘comments on off-label use of rFVIIa that do not consider the clinical context in which the drug is 
being used may be flawed’, and that the published evidence about risks ‘is probably dwarfed by the 
risk for allowing blood loss to continue unabated’47. 
These responses to evidence illustrate that those who have a commitment to a particular form of 
prudence will interpret new evidence in accordance with their prudential perspective (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The debate we have analysed shows that evidence alone cannot resolve the debate about off-label 
use of rFVIIa, and may never be able to do so. Even if further high quality research into rFVIIa can be 
conducted, its conclusions will likely be contested. Not everyone will agree that a particular method 
and the subsequent results lead to the conclusions the author claims. Even the results of 
randomized clinical trials may be challenged in terms of their inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
generalisability, therapeutic regimen, control group, and subgroup analysis. The selection of end-
points of the studies may also be contested—particularly whether mortality is the only relevant 
outcome, or whether clinically relevant morbidities or surrogate outcomes such as transfusion 
requirements, blood loss, re-operative rate or haematoma size are sufficient.  
Under circumstances where conflicting values exist alongside contested evidence we suggest that 
stakeholders adopt different prudential stances in response to clinical and evidential uncertainty. 
This challenge to the idea that responses are purely ‘rational’ aligns with the views of the legal 
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scholar Ronald J. Allen who argues that rationality is a ‘multivariate search for tools to understand 
and regulate a hostile environment’48, and the view of the moral philosopher Shafer-Landau who 
sees rationality as a derivative of values: 
‘…exercising one’s rationality essentially involves a series of operations over one’s 
existing commitments… Being rational is a matter of enacting particular kinds of 
reasoning process that have their origin in a set of commitments that are not 
themselves rationally assessable.’ (p. 100). 
The fact that different prudential principles are not openly declared, but instead cloaked in terms of 
scientific or clinical disagreement, is consistent with Gallie’s observation that while stakeholders 
might be committed to conflicting preferences and values, they are nevertheless all able to put 
forward perfectly rational reasons for their differing positions49. Gallie’s work can also help to 
explain why it is so difficult to resolve these kinds of debates. Incommensurable disagreements 
arise, according to Gallie, because there is no objective way to judge one form of rationality better 
than another. Levi also seemed to recognize this and argued that disagreements can only be 
resolved as long as those disagreeing between themselves identify ‘their shared agreements in full 
beliefs, probability judgments, and value judgments’50. If such common ground does not exist there 
are no grounds for resolution. 
The need for the tools of “post-normal science” to mediate between conflicting prudences. 
It is, of course, important that research into the efficacy, safety and cost-effectiveness of rFVIIa 
continues, and that its use in practice is carefully monitored. But even this is unlikely to resolve the 
dispute entirely. In contexts such as these, where there is not likely to be a purely scientific or 
rational resolution to a debate about scientific evidence, a new mode of problem solving is required.  
The phrase ‘post-normal science’ has been used to capture the fact that science is unable to address 
problems where ‘facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent’51. Scholars 
of post-normal science have recognized that many modern problems are irreducibly complex, and 
argued that solving them requires ‘new methods … to make our ignorance usable’(p. 290).  
Hauser and colleagues implicitly invoke the principles of post-normal science in their criticism of the 
FDA’s rejection of evidence about rFVIIa’s benefit for trauma patients, which is the off-label 
indication with the strongest evidentiary support, they state: 
“…the holdings of the FDA with respect to acute care research have made acute trauma 
research in the United States all but impossible… [now that] the “low-hanging fruit” of 
clinical trauma research is now simply gone.”52 
Compare this to the statement of Farrell writing about the ‘wicked’ problems post-normal science is 
meant to address: 
“…in late-industrial societies (that is to say, in the so-called West) straightforward 
planning problems have all been more or less solved and the ones still remaining 
unsolved are “wicked” – persistent, complex, and difficult or perhaps even impossible 
to solve”53. 
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According to theorists of post-normal science the way to approach these problems is not to aim for 
complete uniformity of practice, but also not to leave decisions only to individual clinicians or 
hospitals making purely ad-hoc decisions (as is currently the case). Rather, the goal is to find a 
“middle ground” by extending the quality control function of peer review beyond experts by 
incorporating the views of others in the community. In the case of rFVIIa for off-label uses, we argue 
that this effectively means that the form of prudence chosen, whether active or precautionary, must 
align with the community’s fears and hopes, appetite for uncertainty, and willingness to trade-off 
risks for benefits.  
In this case, the “community” might consist of the clinical policymakers who already make decisions 
about clinical practice guidelines, as well as practicing clinicians (i.e. those at the “front line” dealing 
with bleeding patients), public or private insurers and payers (depending on the health system), and 
members of the public. The size of these communities would depend on the kind of health system in 
place. In the United States, for example (at least for the time being), it is likely that the boundaries of 
health insurance companies would determine the size of the relevant communities, while in 
countries like Australia, with national formularies, the relevant “community” would be much larger. 
This raises the question of how to make sure that patients and members of the public (i.e. 
“consumers” of medicines such as rFVIIa) have a voice in such communal processes. 
Involving consumers in Decision Making Process 
Jurgen Habermas argued that the only moral norms that would enable resolution of disagreements 
were those that were agreed to by all those affected by the application of it54. We agree with this 
principle in general but believe that in practice it has certain serious limitations. First, is the problem 
of defining those affected; second, is the fact that not all those affected are impacted in the same 
way, or to the same degree; and third, is that it is not clear what method could be used to include all 
those affected in the decision making process. 
We believe that citizens’ juries provide a practical, although imperfect, application of Habermas’ 
principle, and a useful means of ensuring that consumers have a voice in “post-normal” science55. 
This approach was advocated by the health economist, the late Gavin Mooney, who argued that the 
distribution of limited health care resources should be guided by the community, rather than be 
limited to economic evaluations and the views of a few powerful individuals or institutions56. 
Mooney states the problem in the following way:  
“…until it is known what the good of health care is there cannot be a judgment about 
what is better, and … until it is known what is better there cannot be a judgment about 
what is quality… there is no-one better placed to do this than the community.”57   
The need for such an approach to resolving the debate about off-label use of rFVIIa becomes all the 
more acute in a context where many believe that commercial interests have had an undue influence 
over off-label prescribing patterns.  
While a citizen’s jury will not necessarily be able to interpret the significance of technical evidence 
presented to them, information can meaningfully be sought about ways of addressing uncertainties 
and trading off costs and benefits, and benefits and harms. It is, after all, the perception of 
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uncertainty that led to the intransigence of the disputants in the first place, and trade-offs are 
essentially value judgments, which cannot be reduced to technicalities.  
For this to work, uncertainties would have to be elaborated and made explicit to participants in the 
decision making process in order to expose them ‘to the fundamentally political nature of the final 
decisions at which they arrive’58. How this might be done is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, some thoughts on how statistical evidence might be presented ‘innocently’ so that it may 
be better interpreted by juries are presented by Ligertwood and Edmond59. They argue that 
evidence needs to not only be relayed accurately but also in a way that conforms to ‘lay capabilities’, 
since statistical reasoning is not necessarily intuitive or natural. Frameworks for clarifying and 
communicating uncertainties have been developed, for instance the NUSAP system developed by 
Funtaowicz and Ravetz to alert people to the fact that statistical work has a social dimension, and to 
make apparent the ‘meaningfulness’ and quality of numerical expressions60.  
It must be realized that none of these processes or frameworks guarantee a resolution to debates 
such as that surrounding off-label prescribing of rFVIIa. But they do make explicit the moral and 
political dimensions of science and medicine. And this, in turn, reminds us that these debates—even 
about individual therapeutic agents such as rFVIIa—are ultimately about what we, as a society, want 
from our health system and how health care can be democratized so that citizens can participate in 
decision-making. 
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